The transcripts of the official inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press. More…


  • Mr Hayman, first of all, your full name, please?

  • It's Andrew Christopher Hayman.

  • Thank you. You provided a statement to the Inquiry dated 14 February of this year. You signed and dated it and there's a statement of truth. Is this your formal evidence to the Inquiry?

  • I hope you have a copy of your statement --

  • -- and a couple of exhibits in front of you. In relation to your career, you started at Essex Police in 1978. You worked your way through the ranks. You were Chief Constable in Norfolk between 2002 and 2005, and then you transferred back to the MPS as an Assistant Commissioner in charge of specialist operations, and so it follows then for Operation Caryatid you were in charge in the sense that you were responsible, although you didn't have day-to-day conduct of operations; is that right?

  • It's a small point, but just worth clarifying, really, that you're right in saying that day-to-day responsibility was taken by others, but I remained accountable for not only that operation but everything else that's going on. The buck stops with me.

  • Yes. We will deal more precisely with what you did or did not do in relation to Operation Caryatid in a moment.

    You announced your retirement from the police service in December 2007 and left in April 2008.

    In terms of the relationship between the MPS and the media, you deal with this in paragraphs 11 and following, our page number 02224, just how would you define, Mr Hayman, what you describe as a healthy collaborative working relationship; what are the incidents of that relationship and the purposes of that relationship?

  • I think to understand that maybe go to the other side of the coin and one that's unhealthy and one that's not helpful to reduce crime, to make sure the public are well informed and then unaccurate reporting, and also that not only bad news but good news gets out. I think it may be seen as a bit of a generalisation, but I think it's not just about the Met, it's also about the rest of the country in UK policing.

    Some years ago there was a reserve position which very much kept the press and the media at arm's length, and I don't think that that is a tenable position. And I certainly, after 7/7, felt that that was an impossible position, because the hunger for information was such that if you did not share information then there was massive speculation, and so the balance needs to be struck between on the one hand making sure that there is a clear division between what the roles of the media are and the police, and on the other, making sure that there is a collaborative relationship which has developed over time when there's no crisis, non-extremist, so that actually when you now need to use the media to ask for witness help or to put suspects' pictures out onto the press for trying to arrest people, you're not just making that one phone call out of the blue, actually there's a relationship already developed, which hopefully will give you the co-operation and support that I think the wider community would look for.

  • Thank you. In paragraph 16 --

  • That reflects, presumably, your view as the ACPO lead on media?

  • Yes, sir. Thank you for that point. What happened -- I forget the exact timing of it, but it was shortly after I returned back to the Met and I was -- no, actually it was before that, I was a Chief Constable in Norfolk. The then ACPO president, Sir Chris Fox, was concerned that actually nationally the relationship and co-operation between the police and the media could be improved. I competed against I think one other Chief Constable to pledge to try and improve it and in one of my exhibits we managed to retrieve my presentation, which sets out exactly how I thought we could work over the next sort of couple of years as part of a development plan. I haven't got it literally to hand here, but it's certainly in the bundle.

  • Yes. I think it's probably in that little file there.

  • And it's probably behind divider 2.

  • Thank you, sir. Maybe just for those who haven't got it in front of me perhaps if I just read out a few points that I think might be pertinent.

  • This was the start of a strategic plan, with action plans underneath it, and it had a national footprint, so I was looking to get the co-operation from other chief constables going to ACPO -- Association of Chief Police Officers -- meetings. I wanted to develop communications, which I thought would be focused on the citizen, neighbourhood policing, trying to understand the enhanced profile of ACPO and its work, increase the awareness of communications, what role we would play in that. Basically trying to professionalise the service and improve the reputation.

    I considered that the benefits of that was it would be a better use of resources, it improved efficiency. We were using our communication people better because I think some of our professional staff in the media, as it were, worked for us, were not given the support they should have done, and there was a professional communications advice with greater influence.

    There's quite a weird sort of diagram there which I won't go to try and explain here because it might be more difficult, but that's really the headline of it, sir.

  • Paragraph 16, towards the top of 02226 on the internet numbering page 6, you say you concluded that there was benefit on both sides to having a professional relationship but the terms of engagement between the two had to be clearly understood. How would you define the terms of engagement, as it were?

  • I came to this work with the background -- and I've put this in my statement -- of being very reserved towards the media. I didn't feel I needed to engage, because I felt that sometimes that kind of relationship was difficult. There was some -- if you went and speak with colleagues, there were probably experiences where it wasn't particularly positive on either side. So I saw that at worst there could be the media's objective to try and get exclusives and cross a line, and on the other side at worst, from the police side, the danger would be that maybe people would cosy up and start leaking inappropriately information to the media.

    But I didn't feel that that was necessarily an obstacle to embark on this work. That was just something that we needed to manage.

    I have to say, trying to drive this nationally was difficult, because I think people always went to their default position of this is just too difficult, I'm not going to do it.

  • You told the Select Committee, I think, that your career choice was always between police and journalism. It might be said that very statement indicates that you might be close, if not overly close, to people in the media. Is that a fair interpretation or not?

  • I would say that up until 2005, July 2005, that was not the case. That was a -- I shared that with the Home Affairs Select Committee. It was a private thought, and I did it to illustrate a point at the time and I stand by that. That's not something I paraded elsewhere.

    I had a wake-up call on the post -- the attacks on 7 July when suddenly the international media were there and I realised that this was just an untenable position to keep that amount of distance between the international media and we had to do something about that. Now, the fact that there may have been personal aspirations and interest in writing is a side issue as to what professionally we had to do to make sure the police service was well equipped and well positioned to deal with extremists on a scale we'd never dealt with before.

  • In paragraph 32, page 02231, you say you would "like to think that the media saw their contact with me as an opportunity to gain a better understanding of the challenges the police were facing", et cetera.

    Now, maybe that was a careful choice of words, you would "like to think". It suggests that perhaps the media saw the purpose of their contact with you more broadly or differently. Is that what you're trying to say or to avoid saying?

  • No. That's a very astute observation. What I'm trying to diplomatically say, I think if you look at the media in its broadest sense, which just doesn't include the written media, it includes radio and TV, is that there's not one type, there's all different styles and approaches, just as there are with senior police officers or junior police officers. It would be a lot easier, wouldn't it, if everyone was operating in the same way, but they don't, and therefore I think what I'm trying to say there diplomatically is there may be -- I would like to think that the mainstream would see it for what it is, that relationship, but I hope I'm not naive to realise that there may be other agendas playing which people might seek to exploit.

  • What was your attitude in relation to social encounters with members of the media? Particularly dinners I'm referring to.

  • Yes. I think we would describe the relationship in the Met, which it certainly wasn't my idea and I put that in my statement, I can't remember whether I inherited it or not, but there was a structure in place where with this Crime Reporters Association there were regular lunches which my colleague, Peter Clarke, would go to, and when I joined the Met, that's something that I did as well. And it's on as regular basis.

    The purpose of those lunches was to develop and foster the relationship I tried to describe earlier where you just didn't pick the phone up when you wanted something.

    Of course I was operating here with two hats on, and I was trying to do the same nationally with the ACPO media group hat on, and therefore what I felt there was an awful lot of benefit in probably going the extra mile with that ACPO hat on, because I wanted to get traction not just in London but also elsewhere, and I wanted to support the media officers within each force accordingly.

    So that would extend beyond a lunch, and I would have meetings in the evening at dinner, not necessarily in London, it could be elsewhere. And I remember one event which I put in my statement was with the Society of Editors where I think I spoke at their conference, so it would be beyond just those CRA lunches, but I would want to make sure everyone understood that the social scene of interacting was businesslike, but it was also to develop the relationship which hopefully I could have built on around that plan I set out.

  • So entirely businesslike and always within proper bounds, is that the way you would characterise it?

  • What is your reaction to page 237 of Lord Blair's book in relation to you where he says that something went wrong:

    "I began to pick up that Andy seemed to be spending a great deal of time with the press. Quite early on there were rumours that he was briefing in a careless and sometimes disloyal manner, although I never had any proof."

    He's making two points there. Can we deal with the first point, an implied criticism, spending too much time with the press and inappropriately.

  • If you viewed it as my primary role in the Met, I can understand why he might say that, his opinion. But if you put my other hat on as well, I would argue that that was a proportionate amount of time being spent. He's expressed a view there about information that was being shared. I completely disagree with that and I think it's important that he does qualify that at the end.

  • He does. Then he says, page 240:

    "So what happened? Perhaps Andy got carried away by the power and prestige of his job. Burned the candle at both ends, developed a lifestyle of late evenings and could not see the danger to his professional standing."

    Well, the lifestyle of late evenings may well be intended to accommodate, in that sentence, late evenings with members of the press; is that right?

  • That's not right. I am not saying that there weren't meetings in the evening with the press. I'm sure that they could be found. What I will say is that the hours that were being worked through that period between 2005 and beyond, even after I retired, were on a scale that no other -- none of us in our team had experienced before, to the point where fatigue across the team, both junior and senior levels, was a regular facet of work.

  • May we look at some entries in relation to you and the gifts and hospitality register, the first page of which is 6382. This is the formal register, of course, which --

  • Would you direct me on the papers here, please?

  • Well, I think you have printed out only the pages which relate to you for the period March 2005 to April 2007; is that correct? This is in the register. If not, it's going to come up on that screen.

  • I'm not quite sure whether that --

  • No, that's Mr Hogan-Howe.

  • I think in order that you make progress, let Mr Hayman have my copy. (Handed).

  • I also have your personal diary, in the sense that the Metropolitan Police have transcribed for me, as they have done in relation to the previous witness, Mr Yates.

    There was a dinner, 8 November 2005, with Lucy Panton, who of course was with the News of the World, and that does feature in the register.

  • On the third page. The register doesn't tell us, because strictly speaking it's right, the offer, as it says, comes from the News of the World. It's to you in your capacity as ACSO; is that right?

  • Described as a working dinner. What sort of things might have been discussed at that dinner with Lucy Panton?

  • There was another, on my recollection, I've put it in my statement, I can't be 100 per cent sure about this, but what I can -- so I'm in a way speculating, but given the timing of this and it was shortly after the attacks, we were keen -- sorry, the News of the World were keen to run campaigns to help tackle the threat from terrorism. They had some rough ideas of what they wanted to do, and I recall trying to guide and give advice on that.

    A good example of that was when the airline plot was discovered and we had a very graphic reproduction of a plane -- a pressurised plane being exploded with the types of explosive that were going to be smuggled onto the plane and we wanted to run an article in the paper about that, and then put on the website the reconstruction of the video.

    So when we talk about working dinner, I can't accurately remember what that was about, but it was certainly in line with my recollection that the paper was being proactive about trying to tackle the whole issue of this unfolding home-grown threat from terrorism.

  • Three days later there's a meeting at the News of the World offices, it's not in the gifts and hospitality register because there may well not have been any hospitality, because it's only between, according to the diary, 12.30 to 13.00 hours, and Lucy Panton was going to meet you at the entrance. Can you remember what that --

  • I haven't got that in front of me. It's very difficult to remember that, Mr Jay, but I'm trying to be helpful. Not knowing you were going to ask that question, that does fall in line with my recollection which I've just rehearsed to answer the previous question. I can only guess that it was something to do with a campaign. That working dinner would have been probably because it was very busy during the day, that was the only time to get it, and it was a precursor before going to their building maybe to develop the conversation further, but I'm guessing.

  • 25 April 2006, which is on the internal numbering page 5 of the hospitality register, it's:

    "Dinner, editor and deputy editor of the News of the World."

  • And the location we don't know from that document but probably do from the diary.

  • I think I can help you on that. I believe that it was Soho House, I think.

  • Well, it's all correctly recorded in the hospitality register, as we can see. The editor and deputy editor, editor at the time was Mr Coulson. The deputy editor, I believe, was Mr Wallis, but I'm not 100 per cent sure. Maybe you could help on that.

  • What was the purpose of that dinner?

  • I can't remember, but what I do remember from that was it -- ordinarily that would be not some -- those people would not be someone from professional life that I would be on a daily contact with. That dinner was not arranged by me, my recollection is it was arranged by the Met's director of public affairs, and it was -- I imagine it was to meet these two people, because I didn't know them beforehand, and I -- so I'm half guessing but I think it's just to meet them.

  • Well, it's clear from the diary that Mr Fedorcio is there as well, so again that chimes with your recollection.

  • To reinforce that point, sir, I -- it would just be inappropriate given who was in contact with who at the Met at that time and I wouldn't even know what to do in terms of contacting those two individuals, having not met them before. I don't think I'd met them before, anyway.

  • Fair enough. At that stage, what -- well, presumably you did know about Operation Caryatid; is that correct?

  • But the scope or possible scope of Operation Caryatid was not known to you; is that right?

  • No, it wasn't, not in the detail that many think was the case.

  • Okay. The diary entry, just to clear up one doubt in my mind --

  • We will be returning to that, will we?

  • Yes.

    There's an entry in the diary for 22 August 2006. I only mention it so you can clear this one up. This is in the afternoon:

    "Rebekah introductory meeting following Lucy Panton's maternity leave."

    What was that a reference to?

  • My recollection is -- I don't know the surname -- certainly all the events that are going on, people need to know was that Rebekah Brooks, I guess. That was not. That was a member of staff that was going to take over Lucy Panton's role when she went off on maternity leave, and I think that -- I'm more than sure that was an introductory meeting to say, look, this is the person taking the job over and this is as a mutual sort of handshake thing.

  • Because Lucy Panton was your contact at the News of the World, and whilst she was away, you needed a different contact; was it as simple as that?

  • Yes, she was the CRA rep from the News of the World, yeah.

  • She was someone, like the previous witness, who you saw on a number of occasions. There was, for example, 8 March 2007. This is just for half an hour, though, at about lunchtime. Lucy Panton comes to 556 New Scotland Yard to meet you. It's not in the hospitality register, it's in the diary, and she's coming alone. Is that when she's back from maternity leave and you're picking up contact with her?

  • 24 October 2006. There's an evening meeting with Neil Wallis, but it's between 1700 and 1900 hours and it's with him alone. Can you help us with that entry?

  • No, I can't. The trouble with relying on the diary is sometimes the diary might -- hopefully the diary is as accurate as it possibly can, but I'm not -- sometimes it becomes dated, the meetings don't happen, or if they're in there and there's no other note beside it to remember what that meeting was about or indeed if it happened is very difficult.

  • Okay. 29 March 2007, only in the diary, not in the hospitality register:

    "Lunch. Working lunch at Santini's", Lucy Panton and Neil Wallis this time.

  • What was the date, sir?

  • Yes. I can remember that.

  • What was the purpose of that meeting?

  • I can't remember the purpose. I can remember the lunch. I can't remember the purpose of it. But it would not be anything different to what I've described earlier, which is the ongoing support that that paper was trying to give to the terrorism campaign, as it were.

  • The conversations didn't extend further than that; is that right, Mr Hayman?

  • Again it's not in the register. What probably happened on this occasion, but tell me if this is right, is that you paid for that lunch with your MPS Amex card. Might that be right?

  • If the records show that, that -- my instinctive answer to that, sir, is that -- and I've made the point in my statement, that the CRA lunches -- and I'm using this as a comparator to try and describe my thinking on that -- were always under the basis for I think when Peter Clarke went, and maybe my successors, were on the basis that the CRA were actually paying for things, and I over time did feel uncomfortable about that, and on two occasions I paid the bill for the lunches to the CRA and I would imagine the same principle, if it shows I paid for that on the Amex, if the Amex shows that, then that would be under the same arrangement, but I can't remember paying for it but I wouldn't dispute any record that's there.

  • Your expense claims were investigated at a later stage, as you know, and there are two entries for 1 February 2007 which are not in the hospitality register. The first is at Shepherd's Restaurant, lunch for nine. Page 4 on your Amex card, which again is the MPS Amex card. £566, of which £181.50 was spent on alcohol. What was the purpose of that lunch?

  • It was the regular practice -- I don't know whether other people do it, but I certainly did it in Norfolk as the Chief Constable there and also in the Met -- that when people were leaving, their departure, whether it's on retirement or promotion, would be marked as a thank you. That in this instance in my view would be too extravagant. So it was -- that was one of the reasons, one of the colleagues on our top team was leaving to another force on promotion. Coincidentally that was at a force where we were building a new detached counter terrorism unit.

    But more importantly, the reason for taking my top team out there was that we would normally have away days where we would go to different venues for planning meetings for the whole day, but these were people that had sacrificed holidays since 2005, and had really worked their socks off for nearly two years, and I did that as a Metropolitan Police gesture of gratitude because of the fact that their families and them had gone through what they had, and also to mark the colleague's promotion.

  • Okay. There was a business dinner -- this is a Crime Reporters Association business dinner -- later that same day. I gave 2 February, in fact it's 1 February, both of these occasions. But it ended up in the -- or maybe it started in the Oriel Wine Bar and Bistro and just before 10 o'clock you spent £47 on a bottle of champagne on your Amex card, and when asked about it you stated that you recall that this was a Crime Reporters Association representative, possibly from the News of the World. It could have been a female whose name you did not know.

  • Yes, I think the only thing I'd put right there, sir, is that it wasn't a function or a dinner. I can't remember the event. If that's what I said in interview, then I'm going to rely on that from that interview.

  • Just who that representative might have been, might it have been Lucy Panton or possibly Rebekah? Can you help us?

  • I can't remember, sir. But if I've said in interview that it -- and I think I've re-looked at that and I was cautioned against guessing, I think, by the interviewer.

  • But if it's Crime Reporters Association, if it's News of the World, the number of candidates, I think, are reducing logically. It's only going to be Lucy Panton, or maybe if she was on maternity leave, it would have been Rebekah. It can't have been anybody else.

  • No, I'm -- no, I'm not arguing that point. All I'm saying is I remember at the time -- I tried to be helpful but the interviewer said, "If you don't know, don't guess".

  • Would you accept, if I can put this gently, that this is possibly an example of going a bit too far in entertaining a member of the press? Or not?

  • My judgment was at the time the work it was producing was worth the investment of the time.

  • I'm not going to labour the point on these registers, but in the diary there are two further working lunches with Wallis, Mr Wallis, these are both in the register as well, 5 September 2007 and 16 November 2007. And also there's a CRA lunch both in the diary and register for 31 August 2007, and Lucy Panton was there. So some involvement in your case continuing with the News of the World into 2007; is that right?

  • Yeah, and I've never -- and the reason why they're in the diary and in the register is because I've always wanted to declare as best I can everything that was going on.

  • Okay. May I go back to your witness statement and paragraph 42, which deals with your writing for the Times.

  • Just before we move on, I understand your judgment at the time, but do you think it creates or runs the risk of creating a perception of a relationship which goes beyond that which is appropriate?

  • In hindsight, sir, I totally see the point you're making and I think when we go on to the discussion about the Times, the same point could be levied at that as well.

  • Well, I deliberately -- before you got onto the Times, I just wanted to section that little bit off.

  • On reflection and I want to go back and think, well, what was my thinking at the time. I was very enthusiastic about the whole national build for counter terrorism. We wanted to be much better than we were in 2007, 2005. That meant building a national picture, counter terrorism units, both covert and overt, across the country from scratch. What had to go hand in glove with that was a media strategy, and inevitably a lot of that was centred in London because that's where the hub of the media was. So it was nothing but enthusiasm and a bit of a -- bit hasty, because we didn't know when the next attack was going to come. But the point you're making in hindsight as we pore over this, at the time it was absolutely well intended, honourable, but on reflection I can see what people can see.

  • Nobody was to know what was going to happen, but -- well, you've got the point. Yes?

  • Maybe we can take the evidence in relation to the Times quite shortly. You leave the Metropolitan Police in April 2008 and your contract with the Times starts, I think, in August and continued through until July 2011. You were paid £10,000 per annum, not the sort of figures we've seen bandied around in some place.

    In hindsight in your own words, what is your view about this?

  • Would you mind, sir, if I just spent a couple of minutes just building the picture on this? Because I think it's important that people understand how this came about. I will be brief.

    Once I'd retired, I didn't do an awful lot, just tried to sort of make the transition into retirement, and so effectively on paper I wasn't entering the Yard from December 2007, and it was towards the beginning of the summer I was approached not by a News International outlet, but by someone else, another paper, and also TV outlets who were interested to sign me up, as it were. In hindsight I think probably because there were a lot of activities going on with trials around terrorism and they would want someone to perhaps offer an opinion on it.

    This was something that I'd never really thought would happen, and I therefore went to an agent to get some advice and help, and I let the agent deal with all the negotiations.

    The point that I now find out is that News International, the Times, and I think this has been put in statement, is -- got wind of the other person's interest and then that's how we ended up having two outlets, as it were, wanting to sign me to write.

    Now, I did give this long thought, and I thought what is the difference here -- set phone hacking aside just for one minute, if we may. What is the difference here between a retired police officer, of which there are others who have written, doing commentary and hopefully working alongside a journalist who can do a factual journalistic reporting, but a police commentator can give more of an insight to the reader, and working hand in glove, that could actually produce some good reportable material, which would also enhance this profile and contact with the police as well.

    I made the comparisons in my mind, albeit they're not directly comparable, between sportsmen who retire, maybe politicians and maybe financiers, and I honestly did not make the connection that I was embarking, if I made that choice rather than that choice, into a stable that was part of the News of the World. I just didn't make that connection. I didn't know the people, didn't know the editor, the deputy editor. I was formally interviewed. Never met them before. Throughout the whole relationship, never any hint of trying to exploit what may be my contacts, what may be a relationship there. My experience was it was completely above board.

    However, going to the point of your question, if I had my time again and I was able to make that link, presentationally that is difficult and it's difficult to people to probably in a way believe that account, but that is the account as it happened and there are many people who were involved in those negotiations that I think can corroborate what I've said.

  • It's all a perception thing, isn't it?

  • Although presumably if you walked into -- were the Times then working in Wapping?

  • Then they're in the same building, different floors of the same building, aren't they?

  • I used to walk past the News of the World entrance and go down the road to the Times. The editorial -- even when I went to the office, as it were, you know, there was no feel of -- I don't mean this in a disrespectful way -- of the red tops. It was the broadsheet writing and commentary and everything was around that.

  • I think one of the witnesses from one of those journals gave evidence that actually there was no real connection between the Times on the one hand, the Sunday Times on the other, the Sun and the News of the World. They were all very, very different and very competitive.

  • That's what somebody said, anyway.

  • To the point I can honestly say I can't ever remember in that building bumping into anyone that I had professional contact with when I was in the police service.

  • We'll go back to the issue of one piece you wrote in the Times on 12 July 2009 fairly soon, but can I go straight now, Mr Hayman, to Operation Caryatid? The other parts of your statement which we're not dealing with specifically we're going to take as read, if you follow me.

  • It's been absorbed fully into your formal evidence. But I've taken the view it doesn't need to be tested today.

    I'm sure you would wish to develop paragraph 89 of your statement, which is our page 02253. It's the distinction between being accountable for Caryatid, because you were the Assistant Commissioner at the top of SO13 at the material time on the one hand, and being involved in the day-to-day running of Operation Caryatid, which of course you weren't, on the other hand. Is that right?

  • Can I just understand, though, and this is possibly of some importance, we know that you had regular briefings from DAC Clarke as to what generally was going on in S13, and I think probably on a daily basis when you were both there; is that right?

  • I wouldn't -- no, that's not right. Daily would not be the case, no.

  • About how often would you speak to Mr Clarke?

  • We'd have contact daily, but on that particular operation --

  • No, I wasn't suggesting you had daily contact over Operation Caryatid.

  • Oh, sorry, then what you said is right, sir.

  • Can I just understand, though, in relation to Operation Caryatid, how much contact was there between you and Mr Clarke? First of all, how frequently was it?

  • On one hand, I would say, sir. The whole life of it. I think it was -- yes, on one hand.

  • Can we just see at what stages, counting out by five occasions, Mr Hayman, this might have been? Might you have been involved at the very start, because it was an investigation into the security of the royal household?

  • Would it help if I just spent a very brief time positioning not only that operation but others that were going on -- not the detail of those, but the style of working? Because I think again on reflection there is some learning that comes out of this.

    If you -- my span of command was not only looking after specialist operations which had something like, I don't know, 150 investigations, maybe more, going on at one time. I also had my corporate responsibility of running the Met, and then the national build responsibility, which we've already heard about.

    I don't think any colleague chief constable can honestly say that when there's investigations going on in their command in the counties they have all the details to hand. I think you always remain accountable as being the person who's the chief constable, but the day-to-day responsibility you empowered us to do because they're the best people to do it. And what is really difficult is that if you start allowing yourself to get drawn down into too much detail, you're actually neglecting your role which I believe is to create the environment where all these investigations can flourish, so you're putting an umbrella over the investigation and protecting day-to-day operations from the intrusion maybe of senior people and maybe outside stakeholders.

    It was very regular for me to understand the general scope of it, to try and create that environment and give resources and empower people.

    Now, the real nub of this operation, which I think what hacking has elicited here, is that in the widest sense of what else was going on, you're making the judgment is this as important -- and I don't mean to minimise the terrible impact this has had on the victims about the threat to life or what hacking represents, and that will be a dictation as to the decisions made by the SIO. But had we known -- my job would be to make a judgment: how much do I intervene and take a notice of what's going on in that operation? And the more I give to that, I'm neglecting that one over there.

    I have to say, sir, at that time with the threat of a future attack around the airline plot, and then six weeks after the airline plot we arrested 12 more people in Operation Overamp, all of the intrusion from me, if ever, was on the terrorist rather than that job, and the danger would be more effort putting into something that doesn't endanger life means that you're neglecting something that does.

    A long-winded way of answering the question, but what I'm trying to put here is some flesh on the bones of something that says you're accountable but you're not responsible for day to day, but when you do empower people to do the day-to-day responsibility, occasionally you would have to intervene and it's a judgment as to do I intervene a lot or not? On this one, the briefings I were getting was enabling me to brief above and protect them and allow them to get on would be their job, but I had a deputy that I would rate very, very highly and he had a team which he would rate very, very highly and, as far as I was concerned, it was light of touch and that's why I left it very much to them.

  • Can I just understand what you were told by Mr Clarke as Operation Caryatid progressed. Maybe in your own words, Mr Hayman, presumably at the start you were told possible security risks to the royal household. Were you told who the perpetrators were or might be, who the main suspects were?

  • No. My recollection is, in my own words, it originally was identified by the royal command, who have particular functions which does not include specialist investigations. They haven't got the skills and experience. They're very good at what they do but this would be beyond their experience and capability, with all due respect, and that therefore I allocated that to Peter, Peter Clarke, said, "Can you please look at this and come up with an investigation strategy and an operation?"

    So I was actually allocating that to Peter, and my recollection is that Peter would brief me on exemption, ie when there was something in his judgment was significant that I needed to brief up or that he needed more people with.

    I think it's very significant, sir, that I didn't know when the arrests were going to be made, I didn't know when the search warrants were going to be executed; indeed, I wasn't in the country when that happened.

    That illustrates the empowerment that Peter was given by me and the detachment that I had, because I felt that at that time -- I mean this -- I say this term graphically to make the point -- you could have eaten that on what we knew at that time. What we now know, we didn't know then, and of course we would have had a completely different approach.

  • Well, that raises a couple of interesting issues, but what I take from that is that your exercise of command was to allocate it to the Deputy Assistant Commissioner and then effectively to leave him to get on with it, to come back to you (a) if he felt there was something you needed to report up to the Commissioner, or (b) if from within his own resource he had a problem coping with demand. Is that --

  • That's a fair summary.

    But I do allude to what we would do differently, because clearly there needs to be something done differently in the light of how things unfolded. It's about making clearer in strategy terms about that level of intrusion intervention, and I don't know how you would solve that, but there needs to be the check and balance that strikes the balance between the boss getting in the way of people who know how to do it better than he or she does, but at the same time the boss not find themselves completely isolated.

  • I'm just not quite sure -- I'm not sure I understand precisely what you're suggesting. "Make clearer in strategy terms about the level of intrusion into intervention"? Sorry, could you elaborate, please?

  • What -- it's the -- what you're trying to do, sir, is give people their space by creating that environment that they can succeed, hopefully, in their endeavours, and what you're doing is you're making a judgment as to how much latitude -- and that's just not me, that's all senior people and that probably goes down to supervisors as well -- you give that individual, and the question would be that they deserve the checks and balances so they have something to have their own decision-making checked against.

  • Are we to derive this message from your evidence, Mr Hayman, and tell me if we're not, that if you knew then what we know now, you would have wished the investigation to have been expanded?

  • There's only one proviso on that, is that the decision always must be about the threat to life, and I --

  • In 2006, the terrorism issues were such that you were sucking people into the Met to help cope with them.

  • Sir, it was unprecedented. There's again examples to try and illustrate the point. If you imagine New Scotland Yard, the incident rooms for the attacks on 7/7 stretched right the way around two floors and when you compare a typical incident room for a murder would be a room something like this, that's the scale of the 7/7 attack.

    Then we had the other plots that were going on that we were trying to thwart, and of course running in parallel with this operation, the phone hacking operation was going to probably dwarf 7/7 and be, as many commentators have said, the sort of 9/11 for the UK, and that was also the other operation, Operation Overamp, which was the 12 people arrested in Sussex. They were the ones that were, you know, grabbing all the attention and close management, and it was -- I'm -- I feel terrible for the impact for the victims of phone hacking, it must be absolutely awful and I wouldn't minimise that, but at the same time I'd rather be facing questions around that than I would be about more loss of life, which 7/7 was awful.

  • That's entirely understandable and you may not have heard what I said to Mr Clarke this morning that, as a use of resource, the decision-making is perfectly understandable, and it's nothing to do with me, it's the police decision not mine, but I would have thought inevitable. The question then is what you do about the work that you can't do and how you characterise the state of that investigation. The issue for me may be just as much that, what was said, what was done, what was not said and what was not done, not merely in 2006 but thereafter, and it's important in the context of this Inquiry because of the perception of a relationship which might have meant that the police did not go as hard into this particular problem not because of resource implications of terrorism, but because of a relationship issue. That's effectively what I think I am required to think about, and you've picked up yourself, as you've given evidence this afternoon, strands of material which would allow somebody -- you would say: quite wrongly and inaccurately -- to draw an inference about that, and that's the issue.

  • I'm totally with you on that. Just a couple of -- three points to help.

  • Please do. It's your evidence, not mine.

  • Firstly, the number of police officers that were being brought in from around the country was unprecedented. You know, the -- without making any sort of alarmist statements here, the pot was actually running dry, so we had nowhere really to go. Within the Met, that was exactly the same. We see the number of resources that are now being used as events have unfolded. That would have had a massive impact on counter terrorism, those numbers.

    I can absolutely accord with your point around perception, but I can tell you that the team that were on it are ferocious, they have a reputation of being ferocious, and if, let's say, there is a scenario, which some people have argued around the conspiracy that there was a not such ferociousness around because of a perceived relationship, it was impossible, in my view. If you wanted to be disproportionate towards those alleged perpetrators, or you wanted to dilute down the investigation, the security and parameters that were set by the SIO would make that impossible. And if I personalise that, if there was an agenda from me or any other person, Assistant Commissioner, who wanted to dilute or disproportionately ramp up that operation, it would be impossible for that to happen without the SIO calling foul or asking for that individual to record why they want something done in that decision log.

  • Yes, it's not specifically an Assistant Commissioner going in and saying, "I don't think I want you to do this any more." It would be much more subtle than that. Somebody would say, "Well, this isn't terribly important and that seems more important and I have to balance all these resources." It doesn't specifically arise in this case in relation to 2006 because of the enormity of the problems that you were facing, but that may not be quite so easy to explain away in connection with all the later decisions. That's the point.

  • Were there any discussions between you and Mr Clarke as to the possible widening of the investigation? By which I mean not merely to embrace other victims, but more importantly other journalists?

  • I can't recall any conversation on that.

  • Was there any conversation about -- with Mr Clarke about the quality of the evidence? Not merely in relation to Goodman Mulcaire but more generally?

  • I can't recall that, no.

  • Were you aware at any stage that there was a -- there were potential security issues here because Members of Parliament, cabinet ministers, members of the military, policemen, even, were suspected to have been victims of this operation?

  • When the issue comes back in 2009 in July, you, of course, wrote a piece in the Times on 11 July, which I hope you have to hand, do you, Mr Hayman? You probably remember it. In the bundle which has been prepared for you, it's tab 4.

  • First of all, so we can be clear about this, when you wrote this piece in the Times, did you have reference to any documents or were you writing this just from your memory?

  • Absolutely no reference to any documents. Indeed, when I left the Met, that would be absolutely inappropriate for me to either try and elicit that or have any conversation about that. This was on what I understood from my recollection, my general broad recollection, of how events were.

  • Fair enough, but can we look at what you said? The third paragraph, the Guardian has said that it understands that:

    "... the police file showed that between 2,000 or 3,000 individuals had their mobile phones hacked into, far who than was ever officially admitted during the investigation and prosecution of Clive Goodman. Yet my recollection is different. As I recall the list of those targeted [and we'll come to that in a moment], which was put together from records kept by Glenn Mulcaire, ran to several hundred names. Of these there was a small number, perhaps a handful, where there was evidence that phones had actually been tampered with."

    So, pausing there, Mr Hayman, it appears that you were shown -- this was a point which came out through the Select Committee --

  • -- a list of those targeted which your reaction before the Select Committee was along the lines that it was eight to ten pages; is that right?

  • I can remember it distinctly, sir. I think Peter was away, Peter Clarke. The late John McDowall was standing in as his deputy, and the conversation probably only lasted less than, I don't know, four or five minutes when he -- I was in my office, he came to my office and it was along the lines of, "Just so you're aware, the investigation team appear to be creating a list and here's a list of names, we don't know what the status is, haven't got a clue where this is going, but we just want you to know there's a list emerging", and I didn't think any more of it and I remember that being -- on the numbers I've come to here -- and, sorry, there was -- also within that conversation he described where the investigation may be able to identify if someone went beyond just having an address book into having more than the telephone number, but that's my recollection.

  • The list that's being referred to can only be tab 94 of the first file. Now, it's going to be probably one of those files over there. I don't know what that file is.

  • It's at the end of volume 1 of files disclosed. Somebody will find it for you.

  • I'm going to ask you to look at it and see whether this chimes with your recollection now.

  • I will obviously, sir, but the way the interaction went, it was a flying of the sheets of paper. You know, I don't remember pouring through it and looking as to who was on the list at all.

  • You won't see much on the list here because it's been redacted, but --

  • Without -- again, sir, with respect, it was a colleague coming in and sort of flying in, flying out, "There's a list here that's emerging"; "Okay, thanks very much".

  • But you're writing here in the Times that your recollection was that this list ran to several hundred names, which is not actually far from our -- we think there are probably 419 names on the list. Of these -- well, you say a small number, perhaps a handful, where there was evidence that the phones had actually been tampered with. That's your interpretation of what the evidence showed, presumably?

  • Of what was said to me, yes.

  • Can we just see? It won't take very long. Look at tab 94 of that bundle, which is towards the very end of it. The list we have runs to 25 pages or 24 pages. This is the only one I think --

  • I don't -- my first reaction is I don't remember grids and matrices; I remember just a whole sheet of list of names.

  • Can you recall why the late commander came to you with this list?

  • No. John was a sort of guy who would just turn up to the office, and if I wasn't either busy or in a meeting he would probably then literally say "good morning", "good afternoon". He was a very sort of sociable guy, and he also kept me -- I suppose in his mind -- I don't know what he was thinking, but I guess he thought he's been told that and he's briefing me but it wasn't anything substantial.

  • Well, is that right, Mr Hayman? Can we just think through this? From your perception you knew about the arrests on 8 August 2006, didn't you? You had in your mind an operation which was very narrow. It involved two men and it involved the mobile phones of members of the royal household. Yet what this list showed, or might have showed, is that the operation of Mulcaire and perhaps others went far wider. Instead of there being five victims or nine victims, you had hundreds of victims. Maybe that was information which he felt quite rightly he needed to share with you because of its importance. Don't you think that's a possibility?

  • I can see why you wouldn't want to say that, but having remembered what that interaction was like, if he wanted more and it was something more substantial, he would have asked for it. He didn't ask for that.

  • It obviously made an impact on you because three years later you remembered it and even remembered it was a list targeted running to several hundred names, with only a small handful of phones actually tampered with.

  • The ordinary common sense of this, or the sense of one's understanding of the human interactions here, you're the Assistant Commissioner, you're leaving this to DAC Clarke to run, quite rightly. He's in charge. You deal with the more Olympian issues. Yet here is the -- Clarke is away so he's in command for the time being, he's coming to you with something important, something exciting, to share with you. That must be right, mustn't it, Mr Hayman?

  • I think that's probably the accurate way, yes.

  • Yes. And what he was trying to share with you was at least this much: look, this extends far more widely than the Royal Family, it extends to a range of victims in different walks of life. Isn't that the message of it?

  • No, that's not. Because I think the distinction was being drawn at the time between what's the difference between a journalist or someone who works for a journalist having telephone numbers, which is sensibly an address book, versus it going beyond just an address book into something more sinister. And my recollection was this is a number of people who could just be part of the address book as opposed to something that had been more sinister or attacked.

  • But why bother the Assistant Commissioner with that prosaic piece of information?

  • He's got an address book!

  • I don't know, I don't know.

  • If the judgment there is that that could have been a trigger that should have been acted upon, I hear what you say.

  • Let me just take the next sentence in your --

  • Well, that's what I was coming to.

  • Mr Jay, you do it, you do it.

  • I'm sorry, I was just setting it up a little bit.

    Had there been evidence, you say in the Times, of tampering in the other cases, that would have been investigated, as would the slightest hint that others were involved do you stand by that?

  • I didn't -- say that again, please?

  • Just read it for yourself. It's your own words.

  • Yes, I see the point now.

  • But what's the answer then, Mr Hayman?

  • Well, they weren't investigated and I don't understand -- you know, I've written that as part of an article, and to go back to in that office and that interaction to remember why things were or weren't done, I just can't do.

  • Maybe this is to help you out a bit, if I may say so, journalistic licence. Are you reacting perhaps peremptorily to something which you saw in the Guardian, you thought was nonsense -- wrongly, as it happens -- and you fire off from the hip with this when in fact you don't mean this, do you?

  • I can see how you can -- others and you could have that view.

  • Well, that's helping you out, because if you do mean this, it probably works in a different --

  • I have another alternative suggestion, which is to the one which Mr Jay says is the alternative.

    Would you agree that if there was a list not merely of a mobile phone number, but also the private PIN number that could be used by the owner of that mobile phone to access their own private voicemails, and that access to the private voicemails itself constitutes an offence under the Computer Misuse Act, and might also, depending upon your view of the law, which I won't trouble you with now, constitute an offence under RIPA, that is evidence of tampering in other cases?

  • Yes, I would take your learned view on that. If that was known at that time, then --

  • No, there's no learned view here at all. I'm merely asking you -- well, you can take my view on what the Computer Misuse Act says and what RIPA says, and I don't think that's contentious, but if there is evidence on a piece of paper that somebody like Mulcaire has not merely the phone number but the PIN number, would you agree that would be evidence of tampering in another case, in that case?

  • I think it's persuasive, yes.

  • Yes. And if there was a reference in the corner to a name which could be linked to a journalist, that would at least be the slightest hint that somebody else was involved?

  • Yes. That's persuasive, yes.

  • So your view is that in the normal course of events, if there's evidence such as we've just described, or the hint such as we've described, you would expect that to be pursued and to be investigated?

  • Yes. Now, that may be overtaken by events because of the terrorist threat.

  • I agree, I recognise that. So far from it being journalist spin, which is one possibility, one Mr Jay has just offered to you, the other is that what you are here setting out is accurately your understanding of how the police investigate material which comes into their hands?

  • Right. What I can definitely say is that the way you've set that out was not known to me.

  • Oh no, no, no, no, no. Of course it wasn't. I understand that. You've described very carefully how much you knew and how involved you were, and I understand that. I'm actually trying to get to think about what others have said about the quality of the material that actually was available in the Mulcaire documents.

  • Because what you're saying to me is that material of the type that I've just described to you would itself be sufficient to justify carrying on, of course, all other things being equal, and if there are terrorist --

  • -- problems then that's very different. Now, is that fair or not?

  • I think that's -- what you said there with those caveats is fair.

  • Because what you told the Select Committee, Home Affairs Committee, on 12 July 2011, dealing with the Commander McDowall evidence, was that you can look at it if you like, but I'll paraphrase it I'm sure accurately that you were shown foolscap or A4 pages, you think they were in the region of eight or nine. There were three groups of names. There was ostensibly a contact list, which in itself you wouldn't expect from anyone, it's like an address book of numbers of people. Then you said:

    "I believe that the second column or list was a shorter number where I think my recollection was that they might have been PIN numbers that were known."

    That was your best recollection on 12 July 2011, which of course was more or less two years to the day, bar one day, after the piece you wrote in the Times, so your recollection had -- well, it may not have improved, it may be that you just didn't set that out in the Times article?

  • But is that your best recollection?

  • And then the third column, the third category of person where they had technologically proved that they'd used the PIN number and the telephone number to access the voicemail, so this was, as it were, the people you are referring to in the article, and you say perhaps a handful, where there was evidence that the phones had actually been tampered with?

  • I think Lord Justice Leveson's questions were directed to the second group of person, if your recollection is right, and possibly even the first group of persons?

  • Had all of this been explained to you by DAC Clarke or by anybody else, would you then, as you say in the Times, have taken the investigation further, or would you have accepted DAC Clarke's decision not to broaden the investigation?

  • I would go on the judgment of the people who are weighing up the competing demands. I mean, the danger with the -- just holding onto the article is that the much bigger picture, the finesse of the bigger picture just would not get included in that and therefore that gets lost, the full understanding gets lost. But again it's Peter's and the team's decision weighing up against the threat to life, et cetera, the things that have already been said.

  • Yes. I'm not going to go through all the evidence you gave to the Select Committee save to note that you were severely criticised by the Select Committee. Do you accept their criticisms or not?

  • I respect their view and they have expressed their view.

  • Okay. Unless there are other matters, I'm going to leave it there.

  • I'll just ask one more question. Just looking at the Times article again:

    "The obvious way of getting to the bottom of whether more could have been done by the police is to conduct a review ..."

    Now, a review means going through the whole thing again.

  • "... as suggested by the CPS. This route will bring closure by either endorsing the original investigation or demanding further work be completed. In retrospect the speed with which the Met came out and said it would not be reopening its files might have been a mistake."

    Do you endorse that view even more so today?

  • Sir, can I rise just to ask one question? As you may be aware, the core participant victims have provided Mr Jay with a line of inquiry in relation to all of the witnesses, the police witnesses who have come to talk about the phone hacking scandal. Mr Jay has covered pretty much most if not all of them but there is one in relation to Mr Hayman which I would like to ask. It's simply one question, sir. I hope it won't detain us very long.

  • You were asked about socialising with the News of the World. You referred in particular to an event in February 2007, which is on page 186 of the transcript. And specifically, Mr Hayman, you may recall Mr Jay asked you if you were going a bit too far in entertaining a member of the press. Do you remember being asked that question?

  • And your answer was that:

    "My judgment was at the time the work it was producing ..." from News of the World, that is, was worth it, in effect.

    Can I just ask you this. In terms of the work that the newspaper was producing, which made it worth it, did that work include the provision of information to you?

  • No, sir. This was -- can I clarify what I meant by that?

  • This was about trying to get accurate balance, responsible reporting, in an environment where in some quarters people were sceptical about the degree of the threat, and more importantly, one thing that was a real shock to the authorities was that we were always planning for a threat of terrorists coming into this country from abroad as opposed to home grown. My recollection, sir, is that to try and get those messages out, that was very, very important to try and garner support to get that reported.

  • But it didn't involve the provision of information from the News of the World to the police?

  • Not to my recollections. I never did, no.

  • I'm very grateful. Thank you.

  • Thank you very much, Mr Hayman. Thank you.

    Right. A rather unusually ordered day today, but thank you very much for co-operating to allow us to hear the evidence of Mr Yates from whichever part of the world he was.

    Monday morning, 10 o'clock; is that right? Thank you very much.

  • (The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock on Monday, 5 March 2012)