Yes, and the view taken by Mr Justice Morland was that the Section 32 exemption -- we'll remember we were looking at the phrase in paragraph A -- only applied to processing with a view to publication, so up to that moment, and not to the processing involved in the publication itself, and then he went forward and assessed the damages to her in the sum of £2,500, with aggravated damages in the sum of £1,000.
So that's where she got on the first stage. In the Court of Appeal on the Data Protection Act claim, she was unsuccessful insofar as his ruling was overturned. The court accepted that processing including publications, so she was in that far, but it reversed Mr Justice Morland by extending the duration of Section 32 to cover processing on and after publication. So if publication constitutes processing, they said that the 32(1)(a) exemption applied to that as well, and as a result of that, the DPA claim failed.
You mentioned about how the matter proceeded in the House of Lords. Essentially, what took place is that the appellant, now Ms Campbell, majored on her breach of confidence claim and very little, other than a few sentences, were said about the Data Protection Act itself, and all that we get is a short statement that that claim itself stands or falls with the breach of confidence claim.
Now, since she stood with the breach of confidence claim, there is an argument that what's happened is that there has been a restoration of Mr Justice Morland's treatment of the DPA claim, but the fact remains that the greater treatment that is to be found reported is that of the Court of Appeal in Campbell v MGN.