Thank you.

It also relates to -- it's difficult to take different parts of this structure and analyse them individually. It depends. If you have a system of -- with clear, fixed limits and there's less discretion for this Commission, the accountability problem arguably goes away, whereas if you have -- for example ...

The model there is Germany, the KEK, which is a specific body which just deals with media concentration and merger decisions in the media sector and has been seen to be relatively successful. It is an expert commission. Members of the Commission have security of tenure, they have a limited ...

I do completely sympathise and understand where the Inquiry finds itself on this issue, but there is an incommensurability at the centre of this, which is: yes, there are questions of where the technical expertise lies and whether it lies within the scope of this Inquiry and the time it ...

I think the LSE is the least of your worries.

But Ofcom needs to be given clearer direction in terms of what the principles on the objectives are.

I come back to my answer, which -- again, which is that it may be the best use of Ofcom's time, but Ofcom -- the problem of what Ofcom is being asked to do is a real one. It's coming from the government but the Inquiry has a separate view ...

So my view would that be recommending indicative percentages is where the Inquiry should be. There is a further difficulty, as I'm sure you're aware, which is the nature of the current interplay between the government, Ofcom and the provision of advice. The advice which was provided to ...

Where we are in the policy cycle is that it's presumably for you to recommend and for Parliament to --

My fundamental question is: why is it in there? Why is there the reference to the plurality of the media in these terms of reference? I don't think it would be convincing to argue that it is in there in case the self-regulatory structure that you suggest somehow impacts ...

Mm-hm. Obviously it's for you, and I welcome the chance to --

Mm-hm.

Well, the public interest considerations, if you are to permit the merger, involve a consideration of whether -- and I think we have seen this in relation to, for example, the Sunday Times -- when a newspaper claims that it is in financial difficulty and may close, therefore should be permitted to ...

Well, there may be -- it comes to a point, also, of market exit, and I think that's part of the intention of these clauses, is when a regulator faces a choice between allowing a news outlet to close and allowing them to merge. In the former case, you may ...

There may be cases where -- if you think of US newspaper markets, which tend to be local or regional monopolies -- it's an internal plurality point, really. Because they are monopolies, they have to represent a wider number of views. Secondly, there's an economic theory called Hotelling's effect ...

Well, in a merger context, we're not saying that, and I think we're reasonably clear that we're actually saying that these objectives should remain. I think it's an issue for guidance, for clearly identifying measures, criteria and metrics which enable each of those different objectives to ...

Okay. What this table does is set out a description of different methodologies which are used in Italy, Belgium, France, the UK -- and there are two measures for the UK. And what the table is trying to explain is my fundamental observation about -- particularly the UK framework is that it ...

The method that we're suggesting draws on the Ofcom share of references approach. So to a certain extent, we would -- which is basically a survey, which asks media users what of a list of services they could -- they recall having used recently. Now, that obviously begs the question: what ...

But within a system of limits on media ownership, we're simply proposing that -- we make a number of points about what the best methodologies are, comparing the methods of -- which are used in regulators in other countries, and we find that it's possible, for example, to make a ...

What we do in this paper is not offer you a fully complete, all bells and whistles system for measuring and limiting media plurality. We offer some advice and comments on proposals of others.

Secondly is the position in the market across all genres.

I think it's relevant to refer also to the recent Ofcom report, which sets out some methods, and I would argue without specifying really whether we're speaking about triggers for a review or absolute caps or some form of monitoring and reporting as part of a continuous review ...

Yes, as a suggestion, but we acknowledge Ofcom's point that it is a trade-off, really, between what's practical just in terms of measurement and what is desirable in terms of a full assessment. We think it is possible to have a full assessment, although I should -- I don ...

So if I can just draw this point together. Plurality obligations, which include structural limits on media ownership and also internal pluralism, as you've been discussing, are fundamental. I think that's what sets this Inquiry out against previous, for example, commissions on the press. Previous royal commissions on ...

The case was about a broadcaster that was awarded a licence by the regulator in, I think, 2000 in Italy, but then was not actually awarded the frequencies to broadcast. This was viewed within Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights as an infringement not only of freedom ...

There are many -- watching the Inquiry unfold, I've had the distinct impression that media pluralism is treated as an add-on, and at the centre of the Inquiry is a reform of self-regulation, whereas I and a number of colleagues see it the other way around, not only reading the ...

Yes.

I think it would be useful if I linked this to the discussion of -- the remit of this Inquiry and what this Inquiry's asked to do, if you'll permit me.

Yes. Just to enter a caveat, I was reminded during the break by my co-author that the earlier point about numbers of people serving on councils should be clarified, because much smaller numbers serve on the actual complaints-handling body in many cases. So it might be a lower number. But ...

Nothing. You have clarified that in my mind. Thank you.

Mm-hm.

I'm thinking of some experience in other countries where, for example, defamation, sometimes privacy claims, can be used to shut newspapers, if the liability costs are so high that in effect what you're proposing is a compulsory system. So it may be a question of calibrating those incentives ...

Yes. There is -- because the incentives have been discussed quite a lot, I should say that particularly when you have financial incentives -- there may be a continuum. If the financial penalties for being outside are too great, it may be very close to an obligation to either join or simply ...

We have discussed that point and I agree.

If I may just clarify in relation to regulating all news media, I would argue that for broadcasting there's a potential, possibly at a later date, to bring fairness and privacy complaints to this body, and for Internet services, I would argue an initial period in which this would ...

Mm-hm.

Yes, the Swedish.

Mm.

I think that's fair. I think it is, if you like, structural. So the safeguards and fire walls and internal structure of the body really needs to be looked at very carefully.

If I might just take a couple of steps back and refer to something that Ed Richards ...

Mm-hm.

Just to take the example of the Press Complaints Commission, the power to initiate complaints has really only extremely rarely been used. I believe it does exist, but the ability, for example, in relation to privacy violations or in relation, for example, to the McCanns, to act also when there ...

Absolutely. And everything I've said really comes with the same general thrust, which is that the overall ownership and control of the Press Council should be more independent and more visibly independent from the owners and the publishers.

I can say a little bit more in general terms about ...

That is a reasonable conclusion, but I wouldn't say -- certainly not higher than that, possibly slightly lower than that.

We're drawn to that conclusion -- to a certain extent, it's a trivial, technical and slightly obvious point. In Germany and Luxembourg, more than 20 people serve on the council. That would strike -- that strikes us as excessive. It's also the case in Switzerland and the Netherlands, but ...

Any future publication will correct that. This is of course co-regulation, by definition.

Well spotted.

That is. There's are more fundamental related point. Part of this is about efficiencies. You do want a system which doesn't involve too many cases going through formal adjudication, and you want a system which is accessible to complainants, also those that can't fund huge costs, but ...

If I can expand, state involvement is another one of those areas where there are huge sensitivities, some of them principled, some of them based on self-interest. Some of the elements of proposals for reform -- in fact, I think probably most of them -- contain some form of incentive, either access ...

Yes.

Well, the evidence comes from two research projects which are based on interviews and comparison of codes, one which was conducted by Professor Manuel Puppis and published, as I mentioned, in German, I think 2010, and one which is a study which I'm happy to provide to the Inquiry ...