I agree.

-- around special advisers. I think the problem in terms of actually inserting a line manager is the problem of that line manager, I suppose, could conceivably be another special adviser at the centre or something like that, but then that would be quite a remote presence not actually actively involved ...

I think you make a powerful case. What I've observed is that in every department -- what you say about Secretaries of State or ministers in charge of departments is true and, in my experience, they do not provide, could not possibly be expected to provide, the sort of line ...

-- and if it would help, we can provide, obviously, a copy of such guidance, which was issued in the immediate aftermath of this, and which, I think -- it was immediate guidance, but it will no doubt be reviewed, you know, in due course, to see if there are other further ...

The first thing I think I would say is that I have to be clear that I think, as I've said, the extent, the number, the nature of these contacts was, in my judgment, clearly inappropriate and not just in one or two disputed cases. I think that's ...

I struggle with that, to be honest, because, as I have said in my evidence, I was present myself in the key meetings, certainly in the early days, and was very conscious from those of what, in my judgment, were clear requirements established and a very clear explanation of the ...

I, if I may say so, very much share your views of Adam Smith. I had a high regard for him. We worked very closely with him and very successfully, I think, over two years or so. It's a matter of intense regret to me that this happened.

You ...

Yes.

Yes. In fact, I recall very clearly this. I was very concerned. It was a very difficult traumatic situation for Adam, and indeed for the department who had worked closely with him and respected him, and I recall wanting to meet with him myself, specifically, to ensure he understood and ...

We were in touch with them, as I would expect to be in a situation of this sort. They made a couple of suggestions on a draft, that was no more.

I -- to -- I didn't conduct an examination in that degree of depth. The Secretary of State said to me very clearly that the nature and extent of the contacts had not been known to him and were not authorised by him.

I did not have the time or the ability at that stage to conduct a sort of detailed examination, investigation of the document, but what I saw that was undisputed, as it were, was a degree of contact and about subjects that are just clearly inappropriate from my view.

Yes, I did.

There were clearly a number of issues and disputes around the emails, not least -- I mean, the obvious one, they all claim to be speaking to Jeremy Hunt when they weren't. There were a number of other areas of uncertainty around them, but even allowing for all of that ...

Yes. I said to the Secretary of State, having reflected on it overnight and having discussed it with others, that I thought that the nature, content, extent, depth of the contact suggested by the emails revealed the previous day meant that this was far beyond what could be considered appropriate.

Yes.

Yes. This is, sorry, a meeting with the Secretary of State?

This is the day of his resignation?

Yes.

No, that was not my understanding, and I perhaps give the expression that the Secretary of State understood. In fact, the Secretary of State took the initiative of seeking independent advice. I mean, his approach, I recall him discussing this, was, as we've discussed before, this was an extremely ...

No, I understood the opposite from the Secretary of State. I understood him explicitly and repeatedly in meetings and particularly with the regulators to say that it was important that they took as much time as they needed to properly consider the issue and that what he wanted from them ...

Well, to the extent that it was part of his role to explain matters of process and procedure, you know, and I don't know whether that made them happy or not, but in that sense of explaining matters of process and procedure that was part of his role.

Well, not within the requirements of this process. Within the requirements of this process, those requirements applied to everyone: the Secretary of State, the special adviser and the official. No more could the Secretary of State, in his meetings with News Corporation, express a political objective than could a special ...

Well, that applies to anyone in the department. I mean, that is -- you know, any relatively senior official engaging on an issue with an outside party, would be seen and thought of as speaking on behalf of or acting on behalf the Secretary of State.

Certainly with the benefit of hindsight I wish we had warned him, and indeed I think one would necessarily want to warn anyone in contact with him.

I really struggle to see that, to be honest, because in these discussions the requirements of the process, the Enterprise Act, the quasi-judicial obligations was meat and drink of the discussion, and with expert counsel there making the points, and I can still -- this was something I experienced myself. I ...

With the benefit of hindsight, clearly, yes. As I said, and as his appraisal reflects, which I strongly agreed with, at the time I thought he showed good understanding of the role and good judgment and was careful in how he undertook the role.

I assessed that those risks were mitigated very significantly by a number of factors. First of all, the very public way which responsibility had been transferred to us, which brought home, in a way that was unmissable, the consequences of private comments becoming public.

Second, the Secretary of State's ...

Yes.

Yes.

No.

Well, he was focused on meetings. That was what he was -- he sought advice on -- he thought it was right, once he'd received the Ofcom report, to meet with News Corporation as one of the merging parties to hear their views directly.

Yes.

What I'm understanding there is that -- you know, and I emphasise that this was within the context of care and concern to achieve an overall fair process to all those considered but, given Dr Cable's comments, it seemed natural to think that they gave rise to the possibility ...

No, I think that's completely unrealistic, to be honest. This was the big dominant political issue. Although this is a Coalition government, two parties in it, the government is a single government. The Secretary of State is notionally a single person, although responsibility was transferred from one Secretary of ...

Dr Cable's comments were about News International.

I think it's a rather natural concern, given all the furore and focus on the comments that were made, that that could give rise to a perception of unfairness.

I knew the fact of his public statement, which I thought was again quite a considered and careful judgment that was particularly careful to emphasise that he wasn't second guessing the regulators, and once he assumed responsibility and it was the advice to him, and which he readily accepted ...

Well, the circumstances in which he had taken over responsibility for the bid and the comments by Dr Cable which brought that about was obviously uppermost in everywhere's mind.

The very strong view of the department throughout this process led by the Secretary of State was that our job here was to conduct a scrupulous process, to consider the issues on the basis of the evidence in front of us, to reach a fair and unbiased decision, and that ...

The very clear objective set by the Secretary of State was to conduct the process in a fair and robust manner.

I didn't understand that he was the single point of contact. He was one of a number of points of contact, and what I understood and observed was that most of the contact I and the officials were aware of was conducted through legal advisers.

Yes.

I thought that the evidence we were seeing was by and large the extent of his interactions.

Yes.

Sometimes, yes.

No. No.

Yes.

Yes. Yes, I would. Unless it was a completely anodyne matter or a matter sort of simply of arranging to receive a document or something completely anodyne.

No.